WHAT COULD BE AL-FARABI “founder of Islamic Neoplatonism” ADDED VALUE? |
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Written by Essay on Al-Farabi by Amin ELSALEH | ||
Tuesday, 16 September 2014 12:25 | ||
Vous pouvez trouver l’ensemble des contributions d'Amin Elsaleh sur le site academia à l’adresse: https://independent.academia.edu/AminElsaleh
editor's note: My opinion about "why Al-Farabi" is still the 2nd master after Aristotle till the present time is published in French in a dedicated article published at mlfcham cultural website27 april 2014:
Amin Elsaleh PUBLISHED ABSTRACT IN ACADEMIA.edu In the following you may find some extracts and my view within modelling of a common approach: “Scenario concept”. But did Al-Farabi predict modelling when he confirmed the existence of the “first intellect” as the highest form of knowledge? as present in the acquired intellect of a philosopher, can be represented through imitation to the rest of humanity who could not otherwise understand or attain to it because their intellects are only potential. This imitation is effective in getting this knowledge (or truth, because it is indisputable) across because it is based upon the sensibles of the prophet, which are those things he has experienced during his life and stored in his memory. As such, they can be assumed to be understandable to those around him because they will fall within the general experience of their social context. Furthermore, these imitations (or ‘symbols of the truth,’ as al-Farabi calls them) will be combined by the prophet into an overall system of imitations, called a religion (din). The Role of Islam in the Philosophy of Abu Nasr al-Farabi: https://www.academia.edu/1789790/A_Critical_Study_of_Mabadi_Ara_Ahl_Madinat_al-Fadilah_The_Role_ scenario? For those who are scientific among you, you may refer to some scenario examples at the dedicated site: http://www.merlot.org/merlot/viewMaterial.htm?id=671880&hitlist=userId%3D401418 conflict resolution: http://www.mlfcham.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category
PART I - Al-Farabi in few words al-Farabi dans The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://www.mlfcham.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=694&Itemid=1430 In the arena of metaphysics he has been designated the 'Father of Islamic Neoplatonism'. This is apparent in his most famous work, al-Madina al-fadila (The Virtuous City) which,far from being a copy or a clone of Plato's Republic, is imbued with the Neoplatonic concept of God. Of course, al-Madina al-fadila has undeniable Platonic elements but its theology, as opposed to its politics, places it outside the mainstream of pure Platonism. 1. Metaphysics
A total of ten intellects emanate from the First Being. The First Intellect comprehends God and, in consequence of that comprehension, produces a third being, which is the Second Intellect. The First Intellect also comprehends its own essence, and the result of this comprehension is the production of the body and soul of al-sama' al-ula, the First Heaven. Of particular significance in the emanation hierarchy is the Tenth Intellect: it is this intellect which constitutes the real bridge between the heavenly and terrestrial worlds.
2. Epistemology
It is the second of these works, Risala fi'l-'aql, which provides perhaps the most useful key to al-Farabi's complex theories of intellection. In this work he divides 'aql (intellect or reason) into six major categories: The second of al-Farabi's intellects is that which has been identified with common sense; Al-Farabi's third intellect is natural perception; The fourth of the six intellects may be characterized as 'conscience'; Al-Farabi's fifth intellect is 'Aql bi'l-quwwa (potential intellect); The sixth and last of the major intellects is Divine Reason or God himself, the source of all intellectual energy and power.
3. Political philosophy The best known Arabic source for al-Farabi's political philosophy is al-Madina al-fadila. At the heart of al-Farabi's political philosophy is the concept of happiness (sa'ada). The virtuous society (al-ijtima' al-fadil) is defined as that in which people cooperate to gain happiness. 4. Influence
The impact of al-Farabi's work on Ibn Sina was not limited merely to illuminating Aristotle's Metaphysics. It was with good reason that al-Farabi was designated the 'Second Master' (after Aristotle). The Christian Monophysite Yahya ibn 'Adi studied in Baghdad under al-Farabi and others. Like his master, Yahya was devoted to the study of logic; like his master also, Yahya held that there was a real link between reason, ethics and politics.
PART II – Al-Fārābī's influence on the Latin West Influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West http://www.mlfcham.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=635:influence-of-arabic- and-islamic-philosophy-on-the-latin-west&catid=313:arabic-and-islamic-influence&Itemid=1423
Al-Fārābī's influence is particularly obvious in the enumeration of the seven parts of grammar, the eight parts of natural science (covering the spectrum of Aristotle's libri naturales), and the seven parts of mathematics: arithmetic, music, geometry, optics, astrology, astronomy, the science of weights, the science of technical devices (ingenia) (see the tables in Bouyges 1923, 65–69). As to the discipline of logic, Gundisalvi explicitly embraces al-Fārābī's division into eight parts, following the tradition which makes Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetic parts of logic, and he further distinguishes with al-Fārābī between five kinds of syllogistic reasoning, of which demonstration is the highest. The Farabian division of logic into eight parts reappears, for example, in Roger Bacon (Maierù 1987) and in Arnoul de Provence’s Division of the Sciences (ca. 1250); Arnoul remarks that neither Aristotle nor common usage includes Rhetoric and Poetic among the parts of logic (Lafleur 1988, 342).
The influence of al-Fārābī's Enumeration of the Sciences extends also to specific areas such as music (Farmer 1934, 31–34). A special case is Michael Scot's Division of philosophy, which adopts substantial material from Gundisalvi, but arranges it according to its own scheme (Burnett 1997). In general, al-Fārābī's and Gundisalvi's works were instrumental in disseminating a systematic division of the sciences which integrated the full range of Aristotle's works and a broad spectrum of sciences, many of which were new to the Latin West (Burnett, forthcoming). PART III - Al-Fârâbî Agent Intellect, Potential Intellect Concept
http://www.mlfcham.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1338:arabic-and-islamic- psychology-and-philosophy-of-mind&catid=302:arabic-and-islamic-philosophy&Itemid=1863 This development owes a great deal to the work of Abu Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Tarkhan al-Fârâbî (c. 870-950). A prolific author, Farabi, as he is often referred to in English, adopted and commented upon much of Aristotle's logical corpus, while turning to Plato for his political philosophy. His metaphysics and psychology were a blend of both traditions, establishing a modified or Neoplatonised form of Aristotelianism which later generations adopted and adapted.
Farabi's familiarity with Aristotle is evident in the summary sketch of his writings that he presents in The Philosophy of Aristotle. The soul is defined as “that by which the animate substance—I mean that which admits of life—is realized as substance,”[12] serving the triple function of being a formal, efficient and final cause. For human beings, the intellect assumes the mantle of substance (Mahdi, 125), it being “a principle underlying the essence of man,” both an agent and final cause (Mahdi, 122). Specifically, it is the theoretical intellect that has this status, the practical intellect being subsidiary to it. The final perfection of a person is found in the actualization of this theoretical intellect, its substance being identical with its act.
Beyond the individual intellect there lies a universal (though Farabi does not call it such) Active (or Agent) Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘âl). This is conceived as the formal principle of the soul, engendering in the potential intellect both the basic axioms of thought and the ability to receive all other intelligible notions (Mahdi, 127). This external intellect is also the ultimate agent and final cause of the individual intellect. It both facilitates the individual intellect's operations and, serving as an example of perfect being, draws it back towards itself through acts of intellection. The more the individual intellect in act is absorbed in theoretical activity, the greater its accumulation of scientific knowledge; each step bringing it closer to that totality of knowledge and essential being encapsulated in the Agent Intellect.
For Farabi, the individual intellect, even when perfected, can only come close to joining with the substance of the Agent Intellect. This reprises a theme sounded in Aristotle's metaphysics, in which the intellects of the heavenly spheres, desiring to be like the Intellect that is the Prime Mover, imitate it as best they can. For Farabi, a person's ultimate happiness is found in this approximation to the ideal.
Farabi expounds upon this and other issues pertaining to the soul in his wide-ranging masterpiece, “Principles of the Views of the Citizens of the Perfect State.”[13] He recounts the various faculties of the soul, following the model of Aristotle's De anima, emphasizing the presence of an inclination or propensity (nizâ‘) concomitant with each one.[14] Thus, the senses immediately like or dislike what they perceive, depending on whether it is attractive or repulsive to them. This affective reaction accompanies the imaginative faculty as well as the practical intellect, which chooses its course of action accordingly.
For Farabi, it is the faculty of will that is responsible for these desires and dislikes that occur in sensation and imagination, ultimately motivating the social and political behavior of the individual (Walzer, 171–173). Farabi distinguishes between what must be the automatic response of animals to the affects created in their senses and imagination, and the conscious and considered response of human beings, assisted by their rational faculty. The former response is attributed to “will” in general (irâdah), the latter to “choice” (ikhtiyâr) (Walzer, 205).
The intellect, considered as purely immaterial, has no physical organ to sustain it, unlike the other faculties of the soul. As Alexander of Aphrodisias, Farabi identifies the heart as the “ruling organ” of the body.[15] Assisted by the brain, liver, spleen and other organs, the heart provides the innate heat that is required by the nutritive faculty, senses and imagination (Walzer, 175–187).
It is this innate heat that presumably is also responsible for the differences between the sexes, Farabi asserts. The greater warmth (as well as strength) in their organs and limbs make men generally more irascible and aggressively forceful than women, who in turn generally excel in the “weaker” qualities of mercy and compassion.[16] The sexes are equal, however, as regards sensation, imagination and intellection.
It would appear from this that Farabi has no problem in seeing both sexes as equal in terms of their cognitive faculties and capabilities. This would seem to be part of his Platonic legacy, a view shared by Averroes in his paraphrase of the Republic (Walzer, 401, note 421). In theory, therefore, Farabi would consider women capable of being philosophers (as well as prophets), able to attain the happiness and perfection this brings.
Possible as this is, and necessary even in theory, Farabi does not elaborate on this view, in deference undoubtedly to Islamic conventions. He is more explicit as regards the process of intellection, a topic that he covers here and in greater detail in a separate treatise, On the Intellect.
In the Perfect State, Farabi already characterizes the potential or “material” intellect, as Alexander called it, as a disposition in matter to receive intelligible “imprints” (rusûm al-ma‘qûlât) (Walzer, 199). These imprints originate as sensible forms that are conveyed to the imagination and modified by it before being presented to the intellect. The potential intellect is considered unable to respond to these imaginative constructs on its own, it needs an agent to activate it, to move it from potentiality to actuality. This is Aristotle's active intellect, as removed by Alexander of Aphrodisias from the individual soul to a universal separate sphere of being. It is now associated with the tenth heavenly sphere (Walzer, 203), being a separate substance that serves both as an emanating source of forms in prophecy (Walzer, 221), and as a force in all people that actualizes both potential intellects and potential intelligibles. Farabi compares its force to the light of the sun that facilitates vision by illuminating both the subject and object of sight (Walzer, 201).
With the assistance of this Agent Intellect, the potential intellect is able to receive all intelligible forms, beginning with “the first intelligibles which are common to all men,” in the areas of logic, ethics and science (Walzer, 205). These first intelligibles represent the first perfection in a person, the final perfection being possession of as many intelligible notions as it is possible to acquire. This creates the felicity, al-sa‘âdah, human beings strive to attain, for it brings them close to the divine status of the Agent Intellect, having conjoined with it as much as is possible.
Farabi portrays the imaginative faculty[17] as having a mimetic capability, “imitating” the sensible forms previously received yet not present until recalled to mind. This imitative ability extends over all the other faculties of the soul, including the intelligible notions of the rational faculty. Farabi adapts this originally Aristotelian idea[18] to prophecy as well as to lesser forms of divination, asserting that an individual imagination can receive intelligible ideas directly from the Agent Intellect, converting them to imaginative representations. Farabi believes the Agent Intellect emanates particular as well as universal intelligibles upon a given individual, expressing present as well as future events, and, for the prophet, particularized knowledge of eternal truths, “things divine” (ashyâ’u ilâhîyah) (Walzer, 221–23).
Farabi naturalizes prophecy by having the emanated forms received by the imagination pass on to the senses and then out to the air. There they assume a sensible though immaterial form that then embarks on a conventional return trip to the internal senses (Walzer, 223).
Farabi's most detailed study of the intellect is to be found in the aptly titled “Epistle on the Intellect,” Risâla fi’l-‘Aql.[19] He begins by showing the diverse contexts in which nominal and verbal forms of “intellect” and “intelligence” are employed. Aristotle, he points out, uses the term in his logical, ethical, psychological and metaphysical treatises. In each area, it is the intellect that is responsible for comprehending the first principles or premises of the subject, and for enabling a person to perfect his (or her) knowledge of it. For Farabi, this apparently innocuous statement must serve to commend the epistemic methodologies of Aristotle over the denaturalized, logically confined analyses of the mutakallimûn, the Muslim theologians. Yet, as emerges later in the treatise, these first principles, seemingly innate to the intellect, are engendered there by the Agent Intellect (Bouyges, 29; Hyman, 219). That universal intellect, for all its ontic priority, is the last of the four intellects that Farabi formally discusses in the treatise. It is a separate intellect, totally immaterial and external to the human intellect. Revising al-Kindi's schematization, and showing the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias' understanding of Aristotle, Farabi posits a cognitive process in which the human intellect moves from a state of potentiality to one of actuality, acquiring in the process a discrete sum of intelligibles that it can access when desired.
Ignoring here the role of sensation and imagination prior to the activity of the rational faculty, Farabi describes the potential intellect as prepared and disposed to abstract the intelligible “essences” and forms of things from their matters.[20] The dynamic readiness of the potential intellect to act is due, however, to the Agent Intellect. It invests the sub-lunar world with the forms that comprise all species, rendering them potentially intelligible; and energizes our potential intellect to receive them (Bouyges, 24, 29; Hyman, 218, 219).
This reception of the intelligible transforms the potential intellect from being a mere disposition to think to the active thinking of the intelligible; a process in which the “intellect in act” (al-‘aql bi’l-fi‘l) becomes its intelligible (Bouyges, 15; Hyman, 216). The potential intellect itself remains unaffected by this metamorphosis, however, and remains purely potential, able to receive additional intelligible ideas objectively. The greater the number of intelligibles deposited by the intellect in act in the “acquired intellect” (al-‘aql al-mustafâd), the more that intellect thinks itself in thinking them. In doing so, the acquired intellect imitates the Agent Intellect, which it increasingly resembles.
Echoing a Neoplatonic hierarchy of being, Farabi ranks the intelligible order of our sub-lunar world, the Agent Intellect being at the top and prime matter at the bottom. Intellection of the separate, immaterial substances of the heavens, particularly intellection of the Agent Intellect, is the highest cognition desirable, except that Farabi does not think it possible. Not even acquiring total or near-total knowledge of everything in our world will suffice for Farabi; the formation of our intelligibles differs from their order in the Agent Intellect, and there is a qualitative difference between their presence in it and as known to us; we must make do with imitations or likenesses (ashbâh) of the pure intelligibles (Bouyges, 29; Hyman, 219).
Nevertheless, the formation of a substantial amount of knowledge, or in Farabian terms, a strong acquired intellect, is that which forms and enriches us, creating a substance that in its immateriality resembles the Agent Intellect. This represents “ultimate happiness” (al-sa‘âdah al-quswâ), and even an afterlife (al-hayâh al-âkhîrah) of sorts (Bouyges, 31; Hyman, 220).
Farabi holds diverse views on immortality, now identifying it with a perfected intellect, now with the entire soul, though his justification for positing an eternal individual soul or intellect is weak (Davidson 1992, 56–57). As with his more detailed treatment of prophecy, Farabi may prudently be appropriating the religious belief in an afterlife, a tenet held fervently —and very differently—by his community.
PART IV - FĀRĀBĪ iv. Fārābī and Greek Philosophy
Fārābī’s philosophical moorings and direct affiliation lie in the Greek neo-Aristotelian school of Ammonius in Alexandria, in the form in which it survived and was revived after the Islamic conquest among Syriac Christian clerics and intellectuals in the centers of Eastern Christianity in the Fertile Crescent. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/farabi-iv
Theory of language
Alexandrian neo-Aristotelianism engaged in an intensive cultivation of the preliminaries to the study of Aristotle’s Organon. Both Porphyry’s Eisagoge and other related introductory material formed the focus of much philosophical study. The issues treated were predominantly related to the philosophy of language and meaning, if only because Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione deal with these subjects. This heightened preoccupation with semantics, syntax, and semiotics, and in particular, with concepts such as homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy at the beginning of the Categories, and name, verb, and sentence at the beginning of De Interpretatione, put linguistic analysis at the center of philosophical practice. Fārābī exhibits a similar preoccupation both because of his philosophical training in the neo-Aristotelian tradition which cultivated these studies and because of the central position of linguistic studies in contemporary Baghdadi intellectual life (cf. Abed). Two of his works are entirely devoted to the subject: al-Alfāż al-mostaʿmala fī l-manṭeq (Vocables Employed in Logic) and Ketāb al-ḥorūf (Book of Particles); and even his essay on the intellect (Resāla fī’l-ʿaql) is concerned with differentiating the various meanings of the homonymous term “intellect” (ʿaql).
On the basis of these principles, and with a wide variety of Greek philosophical and scientific texts in Arabic translation at his disposal, Fārābī created an original and compelling philosophical system. A précis of that system is offered in his Mabādeʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāżela (The Principles of the Opinions of the People of the Excellent City). At the heart of the system lies the theory of the intellect, or noetics, which animates and lends coherence to Fārābī’s entire philosophy. This is the natural extension of late Greek neo-Aristotelianism, which combined on the one hand a long tradition of commenting on and extrapolating from the few and cryptic statements by Aristotle on the nature of the intellect (both the unmoved mover and that of humans), and on the other an ontological enhancement of the status of the intellect that was developed in particular in the Neoplatonic school of Athens (Walzer, 1957, pp. 229-30, 201-2; Walzer, 1974; Finnegan; Jolivet).
Following standard neo-Aristotelian doctrine, Fārābī considered the “noblest” part of logic to be apodeictic demonstration, the primary function of the intellect. Accordingly, Aristotle’s Posterior Analysis forms the centerpiece and culmination of the entire Organon, while the four preceding books (Porphyry’s Eisagoge, Aristotle’s Categories, De Interpretione, and Prior Analytics) are said to introduce demonstration and the final four to “protect” it, by disclosing the ways in which apodeictic certainty can be derailed by arguments that are dialectical (Topics), sophistic (Sophistici Elenchi), rhetorical (Rhetoric), or poetic (Poetics). Fārābī accepts this fivefold division of arguments or propositions (i.e., demonstrative, dialectical, sophistical, rhetorical, and poetical) not only on the level of description or analysis, but also grants it ontological status by claiming that the human mind can think only in these five ways (Gutas, 1983, pp. 256-57, 265-66). Thus in the final analysis even logic, originally a methodological discipline, is made subservient to, and dependent on, ontological noetics.
Fārābī’s achievement is that he was the first philosopher who succeeded to internationalize Greek philosophy by creating in a language other than Greek a complex and sophisticated system far surpassing the elementary efforts of both the early medieval Latins and his Syriac predecessors.
PART V – Extract from A LECTURE ON Plato, Aristotle AND Al-Farabi
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/koons/docs/lec3.html
INTRODUCTION
Al-Farabi was a tenth-century Arab philosopher who had a profound effect on medieval philosophy, Muslim, Jewish and Christian. He translated and wrote commentaries on Aristotle's works and on many of those of the Neo-platonists. Al-Farabi synthesized or combined the ideas of Aristotle and Neo-platonist philosophers, setting the direction of most subsequent medieval philosophy. FOCUS
Al-Farabi's most significant contribution to the cosmological argument is a dramatic shift of focus from motion or change to contingent existence. By "contingent", I mean "actual but not necessary". Anything that exists but need not have existed is contingent. Al-Farabi argues that there are such contingent existences (including all those things subject to change, or to creation or destruction), and that all such contingent existences must have a cause.
Al-Farabi introduces into philosophy a crucial distinction: that between "essence" and "existence". This distinction is inspired by some comments by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics, in which Aristotle says that we must distinguish "what a thing is" from "that it is". The first is its essence, the second its existence. For instance, Socrates has an essence -- humanity. In addition, Socrates has an existence. Socrates' existence is that happening or eventuality whereby humanity is made real or concrete in the person we call "Socrates".
Al-Farabi's distinction is an extension or generalization of Aristotle's distinction between potentiality and actuality. Aristotle describes every substance as composed of matter and form (or essence). In Aristotle's system, the matter is the aspect of potentiality, and the form is the aspect of actuality. For example, a mass of bronze is potentially a statue. It becomes actually a statue when it takes on the appropriate form or essence. The form/essence actualizes one of the potentials of the matter. What al-Farabi does is to subject Aristotle's form/essence element into two components: essence and existence. The essence of the statue is itself only potentially real: it becomes actual when it is impressed upon a mass of bronze, resulting in an existing statue. The essence of humanity is capable of being made actual in many different places and times: it has a wide-ranging potentiality for existence. Actual existence is the expression of this essence in particular matter at a particular time.
Al-Farabi's distinction, if accepted, means that we could have many different immaterial beings. Each being (say, an angel), would be the realization in existence of some essence. Without matter, we might have a problem supposing that one essence could be shared by many different entities, but we could imagine a situation in which there are many different essences, each realized by a different immaterial existent.
Al-Farabi's distinction is supposed to be real distinction in the nature of things, not a mere verbal or mental distinction. In other words, al-Farabi assumes the real existence of universals (types, properties, essences). The essence of Socrates is one thing, his existence is another. Both are real, neither is simply the invention or projection of our own minds. All of the ordinary things we encounter are like this: there is always a real distinction between their essence and their existence. Whenever this real distinction occurs, al-Farabi assumes, there must be a cause that explains why this particular essence has been actualized into this particular case of existence. RATIONALE
Al-Farabi's rationale is clearly of the anti-regressive type. That is, he asserts that an infinite causal regress is impossible. Unfortunately, he is not very explicit about why this is so.
TEMPORALITY
Al-Farabi clearly adopts a synchronic view of causation. He says that contingent beings (beings whose essence and existence are distinct) remain contingent, even after they come into existence. What he seems to mean by this is that there remains a need to find a causal explanation of the continued existence of contingent beings. Some first cause must explain what preserves the world in being at every moment.
CLOSURE
Al-Farabi's starting-point is that of simplicity. The first cause must be a very strange kind of being -- one for which there is no distinction between its essence and its existence. The first cause is the only being for which this is the case. It is wholly other from anything we have contact with in sense experience -- there are no analogies that will help us to understand how God's essence could be the very same thing as its existence. The argument forces us to this conclusion, but it provides us with no understanding of how such a thing could be possible. But, al-Farabi would urge, so what? Why should we expect that the fundamental reality should be comprehensible to our finite intelligence? Since essence and existence are inseparable for God, there is no distinction between God's being possible (the reality of His essence) and His being actual (the reality of His existence). This means that, if God exists at all, He exists necessarily. Moreover, God is uncaused and inexplicable. In order to cause God to exist, one would have to cause His essence to be realized in existence, but this is impossible, since His essence is inseparable from His existence. Where there is no distinction, there can be no combination, nor any explanation of how the combination came about.
According to al-Farabi, God is infinite, since every finite being is limited, and every limitation is a kind of cause. It is a little unclear what al-Farabi means by saying that every limit is a kind of cause. It may be that he means that every limit is obviously contingent, and every contingency is caused. Or, perhaps his point is that limitation involves either potentiality (being capable of being more or less) or complexity of essence (having an essence that includes a specific limit). However, God's essence is absolutely simple (since it is identical to God's existence, which is a simple thing), and there can be no potentiality in God, since any potentiality would entail contingency, which would in turn entail the presence of a cause of God's accidents.
Since there is no potentiality in God, God is immutable.
There can be only one God, since if there were two, they would have to differ either in essence or accident. God has no accidents, so the two Gods would have to differ in essence.
Part VI - The Role of Islam in the Philosophy of Abu Nasr al-Farabiby Alexander Wain Extract from “A Critical Study of Mabadi’ Ara’ Ahl Madinat al-Fadilah:
Philosophy_of_Abu_Nasr_al-Farabi Rational Knowledge (Chapters 13)
Prophetic Knowledge and Symbols (Chapters 14 and 17)
… Thus, visions can come from the Active Intellect via dreams, being intelligibles represented by imitation of what they actually are. These are called wahy (revelation) by al-Farabi.[1]… Essentially, prophecy is the means by which the highest form of knowledge possible, as present in the acquired intellect of a philosopher, can be represented through imitation to the rest of humanity who could not otherwise understand or attain to it because their intellects are only potential. This imitation is effective in getting this knowledge (or truth, because it is indisputable) across because it is based upon the sensibles of the prophet, which are those things he has experienced during his life and stored in his memory. As such, they can be assumed to be understandable to those around him because they will fall within the general experience of their social context. Furthermore, these imitations (or ‘symbols of the truth,’ as al-Farabi calls them) will be combined by the prophet into an overall system of imitations, called a religion (din). The purpose of this religion shall be to instruct the people in this symbolic truth so that they might live in accordance with it. This method of imparting actual knowledge through symbols is, however, inferior to how the Active Intellect helps impart the same to reason. This is because, in the latter case, the information received is not an imitation, but things in actuality. Thus, it is superior because it is what it refers to, instead of just something that is like it. As such, philosophy is superior to religion because it represents knowledge ‘actually’ and, as a result, and in so far as it is dependent on this actual knowledge, life and death cannot be attained through religion.[2]
… Thus, let us continue further with our analysis and see exactly where Islam is to be placed within al-Farabi’s thought…
… For example, al-Farabi does not associate the Active Intellect with the Divine Mind, which is the First in his conception…
… al-Farabi’s use of prophecy illustrates the insertion of a largely Islamic concept into an otherwise Greek-inspired work on psychology…
… those scholars whose work we examined at the beginning of this article, and who claimed that al-Farabi’s thought was purely a mixture of different Greek ideas, were incorrect…
Humanity as a Social Group: On the Concept of Madinat al-Fadilah…Humanity must, if it is to gain the knowledge it seeks, live as part of a social group so that the people who cannot directly encounter an object they need knowledge of can, instead, do so indirectly through the experience of another who has and can communicate their experience. al-Farabi lists three types of social association (also listed in like manner in his Siyasat)[3] that can help humanity attain perfection, and which are ranked according to size: large (the union of all the people of the world into an empire, or ummah), medium (the union of all the people of a particular nation), and small (the union of the people within a city).
… Thus, al-Farabi enumerates twelve different features for his philosopher-prophet, all of which must be possessed by any individual claiming to be this figure. In short, these are: (1) sound limbs and organs; (2) possession of a good understanding and grasp of things according to how they are in actuality; (3) excellent memory; (4) high intelligence; (5) eloquence; (6) fondness for learning; (7) fondness for truth and hatred of falsehood; (8) a moderate attitude towards food and sexual intercourse, and a hatred for gambling; (9) fondness for honour; (10) little regard for money; (11) fondness of justice; and (12) a determination to carry out what he knows is best.[4]
… it is specifically stated, when these characteristics are again presented, that he has taken them from Plato’s Republic.[5] Conclusion …Thus, we see the process of emanation, as an explanation for the creation of the universe, being extolled in a manner which indicates that al-Farabi’s understanding of it has very deep roots in the work of Neo-Platonist Plotinus.
…Turning now to al-Farabi’s concept of the state, this has also shown itself to be a split between Islamic and Greek influences. In this case, however, Greek influence has been shown to be fairly consistently Platonic, both in its emphasis on the city as the best form of social gathering, and its characterization of the city’s ruler as a philosopher. As for Islamic influence, the image of the first ruler was seen to have much in common with the Prophet Muhammad, although also reproducing many features from Platonic thought. But, given the almost certain adoption of the Islamic notion of prophecy in this context, the probability maybe that the latter was also made to accommodate the Islamic image of Muhammad. Thus, it is suggested that Islam also plays a seminal role here, even if not a dominant one, and that a similar conclusion with regards the inaccuracy of previous scholarly opinions about the role of Islam in al-Farabi’s thought can be drawn here too. PART VII – AlFarabi Educational Ideas about the Foundations of Education (Objectives, Programs, Methods, Teacher and Student)By Mahmood Shahsavari
http://www.textroad.com/pdf/JBASR/J.%20Basic.%20Appl.%20Sci.%20Res.,%202%289%299569
ABSTRACT
In this study method was descriptive –analytic,that survey Al-Farabi's views about the foundations of education (objectives, programs, methods, teacher and student). In this study main question is as follows: what is Al-Farabi’s view about the foundations of education?
It can be concluded of the results of this study that this great scientists had a philosophical -religious view to education.
Objective: the necessity of moral education and its importance.
Programs: familiarize students with a specific profession in curriculum includes: reading, writing, numeracy, morality play and music.
Method: methods are based on student understanding ; according to student activities and practice in the reward and punishment methods. Teacher and student: the attention of teachers to students’ talent and ability, attention to its activity,moderation by the teacher, attention to individual differences, interest, willingness, and understanding in students, and exist individual differences in the students.
KEYWORDS: Foundations of education, objective, programs, methods, teacher, student.
INTRODUCTION
Today world is faced with stunning development of science and technology, and the education system as one of following social systems is not far from the effect of this widespread wave.
To day new has discussion been suggested in all aspects of education, and generally keep pace of education system in each community with new developments is a sign of educational system flourish.
Al-Farabi as founder of Islamic philosophy has a high education thought. However, this great philosopher have been identified less as a instructor in Iran, and expressed his educational opinions is less than few cases , and evaluation of philosophical foundations of his thought is more than login to deepen the foundations of education in this great instructor .
Therefore in this study Al-Farabi’s educational opinions and ideas was investigated as a great instructor. Understanding involved with the education system including: managers, planners, teachers and students with Al-Farabi’seducational ideas is useful to the following reasons:
1- Al –Farabi is a Muslim philosopher and also with regard to the education system in Iran is Islamic, based on the thoughts of Muslim instructors is essential for achieving proper philosophy of education.
2- Al-Farabi is an oriented system philosopher, and considered education as a comprehensive and profound, and would seriously avoid of looking at its dimensions as one dimensional.
3- Al-Farabi is a progressive philosopher, and his opinion is conciliator to separator ; also with complete mastery of Greek philosophy and Islam, has developed between these two closely , and chosen philosophy as the fact expression. More importantly that Al-Farabi is the second teacher and with specific skills paid to classification of science and define logic and proof mode for its.
PART VIII - Alfarabi's Concept of Happiness Sa'ada (سعادة)
Eric Voegelin Society Meeting 2009 - Copyright 2006
Samah Elhajibrahim
http://www.lsu.edu/artsci/groups/voegelin/society/2006%20Papers/Samah%20Elhajibrahim.shtml
The purpose of the book is to introduce the different kinds of sciences, their importance and the way of attaining them.
A portion of the theoretical virtues is possessed by people without an awareness of how they were acquired. These are the first premises or primary knowledge. First, a person must understand the conditions and the states of the first premises and their order. The rest is acquired by investigation, meditation, teaching and learning.
One cannot possess deliberative virtue and especially political deliberative virtue without possessing moral virtue.
According to Alfarabi theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues and practical arts are inseparable.
Religion is based on imagination, while philosophy is based on conception or intellectual perception.
Departure from his Greek predecessors was necessary, in order for Alfarabi to be consistent with Islam and the concept of Jihad al nafs, as will be discussed next.
"Every soul shall taste death. And We test you by evil and by good by way of trial. To Us must you return." (Quran 21:35) This verse shows that this life is merely a period of probation.
The Quran states that every human being is born with the divine spirit breathed into him. The first is al nafs al ammara, one wont to command evil. It is the lowest stage of spiritual growth ruled by low desires and animal passions. Man submits to his carnal desires. The next stage is al nafs al lawwamah, the self-accusing soul, where the conscience is active. The final stage is the stage of perfection, al nafs al mutma'innah, or the soul at rest.
There are three main aspects of happiness in which Alfarabi deviates from Greek philosophy:
1) Alfarabi explicitly spells out the teleological process that Man was created by God to achieve happiness ("The Attainment of Happiness" 43-44).
2) Alfarabi's process for the attainment of happiness is a practical struggle much closer to Jihad al nafs than it is to the recluse theoria described by Aristotle.
3) Alfarabi's concept of happiness is not exclusive to philosophers but available to the masses who can achieve happiness through this process.
After appreciating the degree of similarity between Islamic religious theology and Alfarabi's philosophy, we note the unusual absence of Islamic terms in his writings.
His view of philosophy in general is that it is a universal endeavor that does not change from nation to nation or from religion to religion.
Alfarabi believes that an isolated person cannot achieve happiness "For an isolated individual cannot achieve all the perfections by himself and without the aid of many other individuals. " (Mahdi, "Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle" 23).
Alfarabi is consistent with the Quran, which states, "O mankind! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that you may know each other" (Qur'an 49:13).
When political association is directed towards happiness, the product is a virtuous city, whereas when it is directed at pleasure, or wealth, the product is a non-virtuous city full of misery and depravity.
The vast majority of words in Arabic come from a three letter root. سعد (sa'ida) is the three letter root verb, meaning to be happy. سعادة (sa'ada), is the noun derived from the root and it means happiness. ساعد (sa'ad) is also derived from the root word sa'ida and it means to help. Purely linguistically, there is a fundamental relationship between helping and happiness.
When a person dies, the family places obituary notices in the mosques and the streets. This obituary starts by a Quranic verse " O soul at rest (al nafs al mutma'innah), return to thy lord, well pleased, well pleasing, so enter among my servants and enter my garden." (Quran 89:28). This verse is placed on the obituary hoping that the soul has moved from al nafs al ammara to al nafs al lawwamah to al nafs al mutma'innah, so that it finds its quietude and its happiness.
Voegelin's philosopher is similar to Alfarabi's conception of a philosopher, an imam who is knowledgeable of the first principle and cause of the beings. This also emphasizes Alfarabi's belief (following the ancient Greeks) that philosophy and religion are two expressions of a single truth.
Part IX - Wisdom and Violence: The Legacy of Platonic PoliticalPhilosophy in Al-Farabi and Nietzsche
Peter S. Groff |
| logique, développement, amour |
La logique c'est le développement mental qui génère le développement dans tous les secteurs de l'économie et de la société ;
Quant à l'amour c'est l'image de Dieu parmi les humains, car Dieu est à la fois la somme des sciences et le sommet de l'amour:
1er siècle : L'invitation à l'amour chez Saint Paul : "il n'y a pas de différence entre juifs et non juifs, hommes et femmes, esclave et homme libre" (Galates 3:28)
2ème siècle. Marc Aurèle (Père de la logique comme stoïcien) "Le propre de l'homme c'est d'aimer"
4ème siècle: Ephrem le Syrien : "Le sage ne hait personne"
7ème siècle: L'invitation à l'amour dans le Coran : « Oh ! Vous les hommes ! Nous vous avons créés d’un mâle et d’une femelle. Nous vous avons constitués en peuples et en tribus afin que vous vous connaissiez entre vous. Le plus noble d’entre vous, auprès de Dieu, est le plus pieux d’entre vous. » (49:13)